references

2025

1. 

   A groundwater market model

   Igor Cialenco and Mike Ludkovski

   SIAM Journal on Financial Mathematics, 2025

   Abs DOI arXiv Bib PDF

   We introduce the problem of groundwater trading, capturing the emergent groundwater market setups among stakeholders in a given groundwater basin. The agents optimize their production, taking into account their available water rights, the requisite water consumption, and the opportunity to trade water among themselves. We study the resulting Nash equilibrium, providing a full characterization of the 1-period setting and initial results about the features of the multi-period game driven by the ability of agents to bank their water rights in order to smooth out the intertemporal shocks.

   @article{cialenco2025groundwater,
     title = {A groundwater market model},
     author = {Cialenco, Igor and Ludkovski, Mike},
     journal = {SIAM Journal on Financial Mathematics},
     volume = {16},
     number = {2},
     pages = {SC51--SC63},
     year = {2025},
     publisher = {Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics University City, Philadelphia},
     doi = {10.1137/25M1727758},
     url = {https://doi.org/10.1137/25M1727758},
   }

2022

1. The Political Economy of Groundwater Management: Descriptive Evidence from California

   Ellen M. Bruno, Nick Hagerty, and Arthur R. Wardle

   In American Agriculture, Water Resources, and Climate Change, 2022
2. Moment-based Markov equilibrium estimation of high-dimension dynamic games: An application to groundwater management in California

   Louis S. Sears, C.-Y. Cynthia Lin Lawell, Gerald Torres, and 1 more author

   2022

2021

1. Improving California’s Water Market: How Water Trading and Banking Can Support Groundwater Management

   Andrew Ayres, Ellen Hanak, Brian Gray, and 4 more authors

   Sep 2021
2. Do environmental markets improve on open access? Evidence from California groundwater rights

   Andrew B. Ayres, Kyle C. Meng, and Andrew J. Plantinga

   Journal of Political Economy, Oct 2021

   DOI
3. The first SGMA groundwater market is trading: The importance of good design and the risks of getting it wrong

   Sarah Heard, Matthew Fienup, and E. J. Remson

   California Agriculture, Mar 2021

   DOI
4. Australia’s water tragedy has urgent lessons for America

   Scott Hamilton and Stuart Kells

   Science Matters, 2021

2020

1. Groundwater under open access: A structural model of the dynamic common pool extraction game

   Louis S. Sears, C.-Y. Cynthia Lin Lawell, and M. Todd Walter

   2020

2019

1. Liquid constrained in California: Estimating the potential gains from water markets

   Nick Hagerty

   2019
2. Spatial Groundwater Management: A Dynamic Game Framework and Application to California

   Louis Sears, David Lim, and C.-Y. Cynthia Lin Lawell

   Jan 2019

   DOI

2018

1. Formal and informal markets for water: institutions, performance, and constraints

   Mark W. Rosegrant, K. William Easter, and Ariel Dinar

   2018
2. How transaction costs obstruct collective action: The case of California’s groundwater

   Andrew B Ayres, Eric C Edwards, and Gary D Libecap

   Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2018

2015

1. Game theory and water resources critical review of its contributions, progress and remaining challenges

   Ariel Dinar and Margaret Hogarth

   Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics, 2015

   DOI

2013

1. The regulation of a spatially heterogeneous externality: Tradable groundwater permits to protect streams

   Yusuke Kuwayama and Nicholas Brozović

   Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Sep 2013

   DOI

1998

1. Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory

   Tamer Başar and Geert Jan Olsder

   1998

   DOI Bib

   @book{basar1998dynamic,
     title = {Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory},
     author = {Ba{\c{s}}ar, Tamer and Olsder, Geert Jan},
     year = {1998},
     publisher = {SIAM},
     doi = {10.1137/1.9781611971132.fm},
     url = {https://epubs.siam.org/doi/pdf/10.1137/1.9781611971132.fm}
   }